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Objective
This study aims to analyze policy-related and political rationales for Medicaid expansion
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). More specifically, this
study seeks to discover whether states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion were
likely based on policy implications regarding the uninsured or political motives.
Methodology
The approach is a cross-sectional/observational study of American states and the District
of Columbia after the Sebelius decision in 2012. This study compares three variables: (1)
whether each state decided to opt into the expansion (“Opted In”), (2) whether each
state’s governor and legislature were affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican
party at the time of its decision (“Party”), and (3) the potential impact of Medicaid
expansion on the uninsured population of each state (“Uninsured”). “Opted In” is the
dependent variable; “Party” is the political variable; and “Uninsured” is the policy
variable. This study utilized analysis of variance (ANOVA), chi-squared testing, and
hypothesis testing between statistics to analyze relationships between variables.
Results
For the study sample (N = 38), data analysis found statistically significant relationships
between: (1) uninsured rates and decisions regarding Medicaid expansion; (2) political
party affiliation and decisions regarding Medicaid expansion; and (3) political party
affiliation and uninsured rates in respective states. States with higher rates of uninsured
citizens were less likely to opt into the Medicaid expansion. Republican states were less
likely to opt into the expansion than Democratic states. Democratic and Republican states
had statistically different rates of uninsured citizens, with Republican states having higher
rates than Democratic states.
Conclusion
Results suggest both policy and political motives influence executive and legislative
decision-making. The direction of influence of policy implications regarding the
uninsured is inconsistent with PPACA’s policy goal of reducing the uninsured
population. However, Republican states have higher rates of uninsured citizens than
Democratic states. Therefore, inconsistencies may be incidental to overall political
influence and social structure within states. Greater public health advocacy may help to
overcome political barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation.
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Introduction
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA).1 Two central provisions of PPACA were the individual mandate,
which requires every citizen to acquire minimal health insurance or face a payment
requirement to the IRS, and the Medicaid expansion, which extends eligibility for
Medicaid to those who fall under 138% of the federal poverty level.2-3 Furthermore,
PPACA declared that every state must opt into the expansion or forfeit the entirety of
their Medicaid funding from the federal government.3 Leaning on constitutional
limitations and Tenth Amendment rights, numerous states and private sector
organizations opposed PPACA and brought suit in federal district court to challenge the
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.4 The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to hear the case and came to the
determination that the individual mandate is constitutional under Congress’s power to
tax.4 However, the Supreme Court declared that the federal government could not
compel states to adopt a federal regulatory program like Medicaid.4 The coercive nature
of the provision led the Supreme Court to declare the Medicaid expansion as
unconstitutional.4
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the underlying policy of
PPACA—to assist over 50 million Americans who lack health insurance and to reduce
the nation’s overall rising health care costs—and concluded that the Medicaid expansion
provision requires states to do what they have always done; namely, to continue to
comply with the conditions Congress has set forth to receive Medicaid funds.4
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Considering such, Justice Ginsburg viewed the Medicaid expansion as constitutional
under Congress’s power to spend, despite the majority declaring otherwise.4-5
As evident in a divided Supreme Court regarding the issue of the constitutionality
of the Medicaid expansion, perspectives vary as to whether the provision served as a
condition for funding (constitutional) or a coercive restriction on states (unconstitutional).
Perhaps policy concerns, balanced against constitutional limitations, play a role in
shaping such perspectives and placing the provision along the continuum of
constitutionality. In other words, policy may influence decisions to embrace legislation.
Additionally, all current Supreme Court Justices appointed by Republican administrations
viewed the Medicaid expansion—proposed by a Democratic administration—as coercive
and unconstitutional.1, 6-7 The only Justices in support of the provision’s constitutionality
were appointed by Democratic administrations.6-7 Thus, while exceptionally impartial,
almost all Supreme Court Justices’ perspectives align with their respective party in
regards to Medicaid expansion under PPACA. In other words, political motives may
influence decisions to embrace legislation. This study aims to shed light on whether, and
to what extent, policy and political motives play such a role at the state level.
Following Sebelius, states had the decision whether to opt into the Medicaid
expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an alternative plan—subject to federal
approval—to expand health insurance coverage under Medicaid, or do neither.8 This
study will analyze states’ decisions and whether they were likely made based on policy
implications regarding the uninsured or political motives. In theory, the Medicaid
expansion had the capacity to provide health insurance to millions of Americans who fall
under 138% of the federal poverty level.3 If states relied on policy implications regarding
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the uninsured in their decision whether to opt into the expansion, states with a greater
percentage of uninsured citizens would be more likely to opt in. However, given that
PPACA was enacted by a Democratic administration, states might have ignored the
strong policy reasons for opting in— including providing affordable health insurance to
eligible citizens—and chosen to opt out based on political reasons.9
Advocates of public health who believe in the fundamental principle that health is
a human right would like to see states opting into the expansion because doing so would
significantly reduce the percentage of uninsured citizens.4, 10-11 While health insurance
does not guarantee health, it provides coverage which allows access to care; access to
care promotes health.12-15 Nonetheless, political motives, such as resisting enactments by
an opponent party, may put up barriers to health care—a fundamental human right.9-11
This study will compare three variables: (1) whether each state decided to opt into
the expansion (“Opted In”), (2) whether each state’s governor and legislature were
affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican party at the time of its decision
(“Party”), and (3) the potential impact of Medicaid expansion on the uninsured
population of each state (“Uninsured”). Ultimately, this study aims to answer two
questions with respect to Medicaid expansion under PPACA. First, is there a relationship
between policy considerations and executive or legislative decision-making in states?
Second, is there a relationship between politics and executive or legislative decisionmaking in states?
The proposed study is complicated by the tremendous array of factors that
influence executive and legislative decisions in states—such as whether to opt into the
Medicaid expansion under PPACA. In reality, variable interactions and omitted variables
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probably play a role in decision-making outcomes. Nonetheless, this study aims to
analyze the two most likely influences—the potential impact on the uninsured and party
affiliation—on decisions, potentially driven by policy or politics, regarding Medicaid
expansion. Ultimately, this study may reveal a greater need for public health advocacy in
order to overcome political barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation.
The following analysis includes a comprehensive review of literature pertaining to
public health, law, and politics. Each topic plays a fundamental role in establishing an
understanding necessary to conduct a study and interpret results in regards to Medicaid
expansion under PPACA. Following, data analysis will potentially answer whether, and
to what extent, policy or political motives influence executive or legislative decisionmaking.
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Literature Review
The following review of literature summarizes key concepts foundational to
understanding the complexity of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under
PPACA. It represents theoretical and empirical knowledge gathered from the disciplines
of public health, law, and politics. Cited works come from books, book chapters, journal
articles, conference papers, and other scholarly publications within the following
databases and sources: the ACA Implementation Research Network, The Commonwealth
Fund, EBSCO, Google Scholar, Grey Literature, Health Affairs, LexisNexis, the National
Academy for State Health Policy (NASPH), The Pew Charitable Trusts, PubMed,
RAND, and Urban Institute. The search process utilized the following words and phrases:
healthcare reform; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; uninsured populations;
health care expenditures, quality, and performance; individual mandate; Medicaid
expansion; health care coverage; access to care; health care outcomes; prevention; cost
savings; the paradox of prevention; Sebelius; constitutional law; federalism; Tenth
Amendment rights; the Taxing and Spending Clause; legislative history of PPACA;
support for PPACA; opposition to PPACA; state government decision-making; political
party influence; voting habits; 1115 waivers; subsidized insurance; public choice;
economics; budget shortages; cost sharing; fiscal capacities; per capita spending; and
factors affecting political embrace of legislation. Additionally, the following review will
analyze material cited within works obtained from the search process.
The first portion of this literature review focuses on public health. It describes the
American healthcare system and the need for reform, and public health’s role in
addressing the health status of the population. Policy—including public health policy—
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guided the reform and gave life to PPACA. The second portion focuses on law. Law
served as the vector for states to challenge PPACA. Additionally, law prompted states to
decide whether to embrace PPACA. The third portion focuses on politics. Politics likely
guided states in making their decisions. In short, these three disciplines all fit together in
the puzzling world of Medicaid expansion: PPACA arose from policy; it was challenged
in law; law set the stage for politics to operate. The literature review concludes by briefly
summarizing what is known and unknown about policy and political motives for
Medicaid expansion in states and articulating this study’s limitations as well as
contributions to the field.

PUBLIC HEALTH
The American Healthcare System and PPACA Implementation
In years prior to the major insurance provisions of PPACA, health status within
the United States, and in states such as Kentucky, was less than remarkable. In 2013, the
United States ranked 37th in the world with respect to health care performance.16 The
United States’ poor ranking elevates to abysmal considering it spent more on health care
than any other country in the world.17 In fact, the United States spent twice as much per
capita as the next highest spending country. However, quality of care and life years
within the United States ranked significantly lower than many countries that spent less
per capita on health care.18
Many factors contribute to the poor performance and quality of the American
healthcare system as well as the increased costs it incurs, including lack of coverage.
Leading up to the healthcare reform under PPACA, approximately 1 in 5 Americans did
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not have health insurance.19 Thus, a massive proportion of the American people may not
have utilized health services due to shortcomings in coverage. Such shortcomings
translate to reduced access to care.13 Avedis Donadebian, a physician and respected
leader in quality assessment, defined lack of access in itself as poor quality.20 Evident in
a shift of focus from treatment of acute and chronic conditions to primary care and
preventive efforts, those uninsured Americans who did seek health services likely sought
costly emergency services as opposed to cheaper preventive options.21 In other words,
uninsured Americans sought treatment when they were sick. That type of treatment is
costlier than preventive efforts and, therefore, contributes to the rising costs of health
care.21
In response, the American political system began efforts through policy
development to improve the patient experience of care, improve the health of
populations, and reduce the per capita cost of health care.22 PPACA came to life.
Policy of PPACA
Signed into law by President Obama in 2010, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) aims to shift focus from treatment of acute and chronic
conditions to primary care and preventive efforts. PPACA, in general, aims to assist the
50 million Americans who lack health insurance and reduce the nation’s overall rising
health care costs.4 It has two main provisions to accomplish those policy goals: (1) the
“individual mandate” and (2) the “Medicaid expansion” provisions.2-3 The individual
mandate provision requires every citizen to acquire minimum health insurance or face a
payment requirement to the IRS.2 The Medicaid expansion provision extends eligibility
for Medicaid to those who fall under 138% of the federal poverty level.3
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Both provisions seek to assist the vast population of uninsured Americans in
obtaining health insurance. Specifically, the payment requirement for not having
minimum health insurance under the individual mandate provision incentivizes
Americans to obtain health insurance. However, some Americans may not have the
resources to obtain such insurance due to an inability to pay for more expensive options
and ineligibility for cheaper options. The Medicaid expansion provision assists those
Americans by extending eligibility for Medicaid to those who fall under 138% of the
federal poverty level. The expanded eligibility has the capacity to allow for coverage of
16 million previously uninsured Americans and 400,000 previously uninsured
Kentuckians.23
In theory, providing health care coverage to millions of Americans who lacked
health insurance would facilitate access to care and improve the performance and quality
of the American healthcare system.4 While health insurance does not guarantee health, it
provides coverage which allows access; access to care promotes health.12-15 Thus,
expanded coverage would allow a massive population of uninsured Americans to seek
care—specifically, primary care and preventive services. Upstream action would keep
more and more Americans healthy and address the health status of the population.
PPACA, therefore, is a product of public health policy—characterized by a focus
on preventive and upstream action to address the health of the population. The public
health policy of PPACA would serve as a foundation to improve the health status of the
population.
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The Paradox of Prevention
The “paradox of prevention” describes a potential obstacle for spectators of
American healthcare reform to realize whether the policy goals of PPACA come to
fruition. In turn, the paradox of prevention may deter support for both PPACA and future
legislation.
The paradox of prevention essentially says that the results of preventive efforts
are not appreciated because they go unnoticed, are not dramatic, and take a long time to
come to fruition.24-25 How do we quantify what never happened? What do we have to
show for our efforts? For spectators of American healthcare reform to appreciate reform
efforts, they must see results. To see results, people must first need care. Thus, people
must first get sick. However, the policy underlying PPACA focuses more on preventive
efforts to keep people from getting sick. In theory, if PPACA works, difficulty will arise
with respect to quantifying improved health outcomes. For example, it is far easier to
quantify cancer treatment outcomes than it is to show how many people would have
gotten cancer but did not due to preventive efforts. As a result, the fruits of the preventive
efforts go unnoticed and, therefore, unappreciated. Lack of appreciation decreases
support for PPACA and future related legislation. Decreased support hurts political
agendas. The paradox, therefore, captures the difficulty public health advocates face in
the political world—a world that thrives from clearly identifiable and quick results, and
support from constituents.
Health as a Human Right
Despite the tremendous political barriers obstructing the policy agenda, public
health efforts ensue, achieving and maintaining health for all. Advocates of public health
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believe in the fundamental principle that health is a human right.10-11 In the context of
Medicaid expansion, public health advocates would like to see states opting into the
expansion because doing so would significantly reduce the percentage of uninsured
citizens.4 At a broader level, opting into the exchange would provide coverage to
millions of Americans which allows access to care; access to care promotes health—a
fundamental right in the world of public health.10-15

LAW
NFIB v. Sebelius
Leaning on constitutional limitations and Tenth Amendment rights, numerous
states and private sector organizations opposed PPACA and brought suit in federal
district court to challenge the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the
Medicaid expansion.4 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to hear
the case and address the issue of whether Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to enact the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion provisions.4
The Supreme Court came to the determination that the individual mandate is
constitutional under Congress’s power to tax.4 However, the Supreme Court declared
that the federal government could not compel states to adopt a federal program like
Medicaid.4 The coercive nature of the provision led the Supreme Court to declare the
Medicaid expansion as unconstitutional.4
Following Sebelius, states had the decision whether to opt into the Medicaid
expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an alternative plan—subject to federal
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approval—to expand health insurance coverage under Medicaid, or do neither.8 Politics
likely guided states in making their decisions.

POLITICS
“When we say that policies are decided by analysis, we mean than an
investigation of the merits of various possible actions has disclosed reasons for choosing
one policy over others. When we say that politics rather than analysis determines policy,
we mean that policy is set by the various ways in which people exert control, influence,
or power over each other.”26
Legislative History of PPACA
A Democratic administration developed and enacted the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).1 Not surprisingly, PPACA saw support from many
Democratic constituents and opposition from Republicans. For example, former
Governor Steve Beshear—a Democratic governor in Kentucky—released a statement
describing PPACA as the “single-most important decision in our lifetime for improving
the health of Kentuckians.”27 To the contrary, various Republican governors including
Rick Perry—the governor of Texas—took an early stance against PPACA.28 Governor
Perry expressed a desire to reform Medicaid on “Texas’ terms,” describing the
“crushing” weight of Medicaid costs on Texas infrastructure.29 Texas is among many
other states that enacted laws to oppose the insurance mandates and reform policies of
PPACA.30
Clearly, a broad continuum of perspectives on healthcare reform exists.
Perspectives emphasize desires to improve the health status of the population, reveal
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concerns for costs, and raise issues about the autonomy of states in America’s federalist
scheme. Across all perspectives shines a political gleam. A cursory assessment of the
landscape of healthcare reform reveals a political divide. While not absolute, Democrats
predominately express the most support for PPACA. Consistently, Republicans
predominately display the most opposition to it. Proponents of PPACA and its underlying
public health policy emphasize its tremendous capacity to improve the health status of the
population. Opponents focus more on its financial requirements and principles of
federalism and Tenth Amendment rights; specifically, fiscal capacity to absorb Medicaid
costs and state autonomy from the federal government.
Executive and Legislative Decisions at the State Level Regarding PPACA
The implementation and progression of PPACA and Medicaid expansion in
Kentucky aptly captures the relationship between policy and politics in the arena of
healthcare reform in the states. Following implementation of PPACA in 2010, former
Democratic Governor Steve Beshear utilized an executive order to expanded coverage
under Medicaid and establish a state health benefit exchange referred to as “kynect.”31
Spectators of American healthcare reform often considered Kentucky the “gold standard”
of implementing healthcare reform under PPACA. Kentucky’s expanded coverage and
state health benefit exchange allowed for the coverage of hundreds of thousands of
Kentuckians—significantly reducing the uninsured population. Despite Kentucky’s
unique success in advancing the policy goals of PPACA, newly elected Republican
Governor Matthew Bevin announced his plans to uproot the exchange and rollback the
expanded Medicaid beneficiaries to the federal exchange—costing the commonwealth
money and significant administrative resources. Upon election, Governor Bevin
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rescinded former Governor Beshear’s executive order, delivering the death nail to kynect.
Nonetheless, the Governor announced his Medicaid waiver proposal which, if approved,
would restore coverage to those who lost it through the repeal of kynect.32
Former Governor Beshear adamantly supported PPACA and elected to shepherd
its implementation in Kentucky through expanded coverage and a state health benefit
exchange. By doing so, former Governor Beshear advanced the policy goals of PPACA
of assisting uninsured citizens in obtaining health insurance. However, Governor Bevin—
a Republican governor—decided to ignore the success of Kentucky in the national
landscape of healthcare reform and repeal the state exchange. In doing so, Governor
Bevin put Kentucky in a position to incur costs to rollback the expanded Medicaid
beneficiaries to the federal exchange and deplete administrative resources. Considering
Kentucky’s tremendous enrollment success, it seems only compelling reasons should
prompt executive or legislative action to reconsider Kentucky’s efforts in healthcare
reform. The question then arises why Governor Bevin elected to rescind the former
Governor’s executive order. A likely explanation is politics. By uprooting kynect,
Governor Bevin created an opportunity for the Republican agenda to guide healthcare
reform in Kentucky. This opportunity took the form of a 1115 waiver referred to as
“Kentucky HEALTH” which the Governor unveiled in a press conference on June 22,
2016.32 Kentucky HEALTH pleases Republican constituents who wish to see the
Republican agenda guiding efforts in Kentucky. Moreover, the 1115 waiver still expands
Medicaid coverage which may please the citizens who otherwise would have lost
coverage eligibility after the repeal of kynect. With respect to expanded coverage, the
Governor is advancing the policy goals of PPACA. Although, the section 1115 waiver to
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the federal Democratic enactment implicates a political resilience to embracing the
legislation.
In summary, policy and political motives likely influence executive and
legislative decision-making in states.
State Government Decision-Making
An overview of the decision-making process in states is essential to understand
the complexity of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under PPACA. Major
players in state government include the governor—the head of the executive branch—and
the legislature—the core body of the legislative branch.33 Generally, legislatures develop
legislation which it may then pass to the governor to sign into law. The governor may
also enact laws via executive orders which occurs primarily when the legislature is not in
session. Executive orders allow governors to bypass the legislative process. The governor
and the legislature do not have to affiliate with the same political party. If the governor
and legislature affiliate with different parties, that state is referred to as a “split-party”
state. Split-party states may encounter issues in advancing respective political agendas
due to conflicting interests.28, 34 Moreover, all members of the legislature in each
respective state typically do not affiliate with the same party. Overall political affiliation
of a legislature is determined by the party that preponderates the legislature’s
composition.35
With respect to healthcare reform under PPACA, different avenues for decisionmaking and dynamics of party influence may result in cooperation or disjoint between the
governor and legislature of each state.28 Understanding these dynamics helps to make
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some sense of the complexity of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under
PPACA.
Political Party Influence
Clear evidence of political party influence can be elusive. The ideological nature
of politics makes it difficult to quantify political influence. Ideas and opinions make up
politics. Ideas and opinions are subjective and difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, studies
have attempted to determine how political party influence affects decision-making.
A 2003 study in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology found that
attitudes towards a policy depend almost exclusively on the stance taken by one’s
political party. The study went on to prioritize (1) the impact of political party influence,
(2) objective assessment of the policy, and (3) the subjects’ ideological beliefs and found
political party influence overwhelmed the latter two influences with respect to decisionmaking.36 This study finds that political party influence greatly affects one’s decisionmaking process. Typically, an individual’s decisions will align with the stance taken by
the political party with which they affiliate. An article on estimating party influence in
congressional roll-call voting reached a similar conclusion, quoting “[v]irtually all studies
. . . find that political party affiliation is one of the best predictor of voting behaviors.”37
Another layer of political influence exists with respect to the “range of politics.”
The range of politics refers to the degree of alignment with a particular issue on a
continuum ranging from one extreme to another. For example, an anti-abortion extremist
may have the belief that abortion is never acceptable, under any circumstances. A
moderate party may have the belief that abortion is generally unacceptable, except under
certain circumstances. Both parties oppose abortion. However, the first party opposes
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abortion in a more extremist fashion than the second party. Any number of factors may
shape how individuals align with certain issues. One study suggests that lack of
understanding of complex policies accounts for polarization to a particular extreme.38
Following this study’s findings, polarization to one extreme or another with respect to
healthcare reform may come about due to a lack of understanding of the complex policies
underlying PPACA. In which case, advocacy and education may prove beneficial.
In the world of extremist and moderate politics in healthcare reform, Ohio
presents an interesting case study. The governor of Ohio—Governor Kasich—affiliates
with the Republican Party.39 However, Governor Kasich classifies as a “moderate” with
respect to many issues, including healthcare reform. In fact, under Governor Kasich’s
leadership, Ohio embraced the traditional Medicaid expansion outlined in PPACA.39
States also have the option of submitting a 1115 waiver—subject to federal
approval—to employ an alternative plan to expand coverage.40 Through 1115 waivers,
states may still expand coverage under Medicaid but bypass the traditional expansion
under PPACA. Utilizing this process may implicate more of an attention to policy than
political resilience considering it results in expanding coverage. Still, this process may
also implicate political resilience since it allows states to subsidize private insurance, not
necessarily Medicaid under PPACA. Section 1115 waivers, therefore, fall into an
inexplicable nebulous with respect to deciphering the policy and political motives for
Medicaid expansion in states under PPACA.
Economics, Budget Shortages, and Cost Sharing
In addition to political party influence, principles of economics may direct politics
and decisions whether to embrace legislation.34 In a discussion regarding economics and
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public policy, the distinguished Dr. Merl Hackbart of the University of Kentucky Martin
School of Public Policy and Administration said, “in politics, ‘the future is tomorrow.’”41
Dr. Hackbart described how governments typically operate by seeking immediate results.
This principle opposes the long-term nature of public health goals.42 Thus, a tension
exists between politicians and public health advocates when deciding whether to embrace
legislation that has both short- and long-term effects.
In the context of healthcare reform, expanding Medicaid will provide coverage
eligibility to millions of Americans. Health care coverage may allow access to health
care—a promotor of health outcomes. Moreover, PPACA emphasizes primary care and
preventive efforts. Such efforts would make and keep the population healthier and,
therefore, reduce the need to pay for costly services to treat acute and chronic conditions.
In turn, the American healthcare system may see long-term cost savings and a reduction
in the nation’s overall health care costs. However, according to Dr. Hackbart, politicians
act with a more immediate focus. Thus, the short-term effects of cost may overshadow
the long-term investments. As a result, the public health agenda may fail when facing the
political agenda. For instance, expanding Medicaid requires resources. Some states may
not have the resources to support expansion.29 Immediate budgetary concerns may,
therefore, account for an inability to embrace PPACA and advance its policy goals.
Furthermore, cost sharing and other financing likely influence decisions to
embrace PPACA. The federal government and states jointly fund the Medicaid program.
Wealthier states are required to pay a larger percentage of overall funding than poorer
states. Additionally, PPACA provides for a stepwise decrease in federal funding. Thus,
over the years, state financing obligations will increase. Some states may have difficulty
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in meeting the financial demands to keep Medicaid functioning. In other words, it may be
too costly to expand Medicaid. States—especially states with a massive uninsured
population—may not have the fiscal capacity to absorb Medicaid costs.43-44 Additionally,
states can choose how they allocate their budget. Some states may choose to invest more
per capita on programs such as education, which may leave only limited resources for
health care and programs such as Medicaid. As previously noted, Governor Rick Perry of
Texas expressed a desire to reform Medicaid on “Texas’ terms,” describing the
“crushing” weight of Medicaid costs on Texas infrastructure.29 Texas infrastructure may
vary considerably from that of other states and, therefore, require attention to different
programs to meet its needs. In other words, some states may designate health care as a
lower priority than other programs and, therefore, choose not to expand Medicaid due to
spending concerns.44

SUMMARY
Prior to the major insurance provisions of PPACA, the United States healthcare
system was characterized by poor performance and quality. Additionally, America spent
more on health care than any other country in the world. In other words, America
invested a lot of resources only to not get results. A vast population of Americans did not
have health care coverage. As a result, many Americans did not have access to health
care—a promotor of health outcomes. To address these issues, the Obama Administration
developed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
PPACA focuses on primary care and preventive efforts, effectively incentivizes
obtaining health insurance, and extends coverage eligibility to an additional 16 million
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Americans. Extending coverage may allow millions of Americans to access health care.
Access to care may, in turn, promote health.
PPACA is a product of public health policy—characterized by a focus on
preventive and upstream action to address the health of the population. The public health
policy of PPACA serves as a foundation to improve the health status of the population
and to achieve the goals of PPACA. However, if public health policy achieves its goals,
the nation will not notice it according to the paradox of prevention. Nonetheless, efforts
ensue considering public health advocates believe that health is a human right. PPACA
allows millions of Americans to have coverage and, in turn, access to health care. Under
PPACA, millions of Americans may see better health outcomes. In summary, PPACA
comports with public health policy and aims to improve the health status of the
population.
Despite compelling public health policy reasons to embrace PPACA, many states
and others opposed PPACA and sought to strike down its key provisions. With respect to
the Medicaid expansion provision, opponents partially succeeded in a favorable Supreme
Court decision in Sebelius which gave states the choice whether to opt into the Medicaid
expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an alternative plan—subject to federal
approval—to expand health insurance coverage under Medicaid, or do neither. Politics
likely guided states in making their decisions.
In the world of politics, party affiliation and economics likely play the greatest
roles. Most opposition to legislation comes from parties that did not develop it. This
suggests that parties will resist enactments by their opponent parties. Despite policy
rationales, political motives may guide executive and legislative decision-making.
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America’s bipartisan system of government creates a divide and introduces
barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. For example, since a Democratic
administration enacted PPACA, it makes sense politically for Democratic states to
embrace PPACA and Republican states to oppose it even if policy supports a different
outcome. In short, states may not adequately consider policy during the executive or
legislative decision-making process.
In the context of Medicaid expansion under PPACA, economics may somewhat
explain decision-making in states. A state may consider how Medicaid expansion will
affect its budget in coming years. States may assess whether they have the fiscal capacity
to absorb Medicaid costs when federal funding incrementally decreases and places more
of a financial responsibility on states through cost-sharing ratios. States may choose to
invest more per capita on programs other than Medicaid and, therefore, choose not to
expand Medicaid due to spending concerns. This study merely discusses economics
conceptually.
Limitations
Along with party affiliation and economics, a tremendous array of factors
influences executive and legislative decisions in states. In reality, variable interactions
and omitted variables probably play a role in decision-making outcomes. However, due
to the extraordinary complexities in the national landscape of healthcare reform, this
study does not adjust for state economic factors, cost sharing ratios, per capita spending,
demographics, sociological factors, racial bias, or other factors that vary across the
nation. This study takes a limited approach to target certain variables of interest and
reveal potential relationships at a broad level. Thus, findings may be confounded.
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Nonetheless, this study aims to analyze the two most likely influences—the
potential impact on the uninsured and party affiliation—on decisions, potentially driven
by policy or politics, regarding Medicaid expansion.
Contributions to the Field
In politics, “the future is tomorrow.” This mantra contrasts the long-term nature of
public health goals. Thus, a tension exists between politicians and public health advocates
when deciding whether to embrace legislation that has both short- and long-term effects.
Politicians, voters, and all else must understand both the short- and long-term effects of
legislation. Maybe then, more people will understand the need to promote health and how
public health can achieve that goal. This paper serves as a bridge between public health
and law regarding policy and politics. Principles identified and discussed in this paper
may prove useful when analyzing future legislation. Ultimately, this study may reveal a
greater need for public health advocacy in order to overcome political barriers to
achieving the policy goals of legislation.

22

Methodology
This is a cross-sectional/observational study of American states and the District of
Columbia after the Sebelius decision in 2012. As previously discussed, this study
compares three variables: (1) whether each state decided to opt into the expansion
(“Opted In”), (2) whether each state’s governor and legislature were affiliated with either
the Democratic or Republican party at the time of its decision (“Party”), and (3) the
potential impact of Medicaid expansion on the uninsured population of each state
(“Uninsured”). “Opted In” serves as the dependent variable; “Party” serves as the
political independent variable; and “Uninsured” serves as the policy independent
variable. This study utilizes analysis of variance (ANOVA), chi-squared testing, and
hypothesis testing between statistics to analyze relationships between variables.
Specifically, this study compares the “Opted In” variable with both the “Uninsured” and
“Party” variables, as well as the “Party” variable with the “Uninsured” variable.
Ultimately, this study aims to answer two questions. First, is there a relationship between
policy and executive or legislative decision-making in states? Second, is there a
relationship between politics and executive or legislative decision-making in states?
Research Methodology
The “Opted In” variable is dichotomous. A value of 1 indicates that a particular
state opted into the expansion or developed an alternative plan to expand health insurance
coverage, and a value of 0 indicates a particular state chose not to expand Medicaid.
Information necessary to assign such values comes from the Kaiser Family Foundation
(KFF), according to information from the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the National
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Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP).39, 45-46 KFF, DHHS, CMS, and NASHP
directly deal with the issue at hand and therefore have valid and reliable information
regarding state health insurance exchanges. Table 1 portrays data for the 50 states and the
District of Columbia.
The “Party” variable is dichotomous. A value of 1 indicates a particular state’s
governor or legislature affiliated with the Democratic Party at the time of its decision
regarding Medicaid expansion. A value of 0 indicates affiliation with the Republican
Party. CMS has not imposed a deadline for deciding to expand coverage under PPACA
or through an alternative plan.47 Therefore, data for party affiliation of each state’s
governor and legislature must correspond to the year in which each state made a decision
regarding Medicaid expansion. Necessary data is recorded under the “Year of Decision”
column in tables 1 and 2. Furthermore, the method for each decision dictates whether the
party affiliation of the governor or legislature of each state is used for analysis. For
example, some states employed a process through which the legislature developed and
approved legislation for the Governor to sign into law.39, 48-49 Other states, such as
Kentucky, embraced or rejected PPACA via executive orders that did not require
approval by its legislature.39, 48-49 With respect to data gathering, states that employed the
latter are denoted “Exec” on tables 1 and 2 under the “Executive/Legislative” column.
States with legislative enactments are classified “Exec/Legis”. Party affiliation reflects
the party affiliation of the branch that effectuated each state’s decision in the respective
year up through 2016, if party affiliation differs between the governor and legislature.35
If the state was a split-party state and the method of decision-making did not involve an
executive order or if that state has decided not to expand Medicaid, that state receives no

24

value for the “Party” variable, considering the balance of party influence. If the state’s
governor and legislature affiliated with the same party, data for that dominant party for
that year is used. For states that expanded coverage, data for decisions and party
affiliation are up to date through 2016. Additionally, data for party affiliation in states
that have decided not to expand Medicaid reflect the 2013 year—the year after Sebelius
when the majority of states made decisions regarding expanding coverage.35, 50 The
National Conference of States Legislatures (NCSL) for 2013 and respective years of
states’ decisions have the necessary information to assign values for the “Party” variable
in tables 1 and 2.35, 50 The NCSL possesses valid and reliable information pertaining to
executive party affiliation and political party control of state legislatures for each year.
Table 1 portrays data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
“Uninsured”, a continuous variable, quantifies the potential impact expanding
coverage could have on uninsured populations by measuring the percentage of uninsured
citizens in each state. That measure requires several assumptions. First, uninsured rates—
prior to expansion—remain relatively constant. CMS has not imposed a deadline for
deciding to expand coverage under PPACA or through an alternative plan.47
Additionally, the percentage of uninsured Americans in each state is taken at a point in
time—2013, the year following Sebelius.19 In the timespan states may implement
PPACA or alternative plans for expanding coverage, percentages of uninsured Americans
may vary from the values for 2013. Still, the majority of states that made decisions to
expand coverage did so in 2013. Table 1. Therefore, data from 2013 is used. Second, the
expansion would result in coverage of uninsured citizens. It is possible the same
individuals eligible for coverage after the expansion would refuse to enroll and accept the

25

payment requirement to the IRS.2 Third, the expansion will primarily affect the
uninsured population of each state. The Medicaid expansion primarily targets lowincome citizens.3 The 2013 census for “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States”
indicates most uninsured Americans fall under 100% of the federal poverty level.51 Thus,
the percentage of uninsured citizens in each state serves as an appropriate measure for the
potential impact of expanding coverage under Medicaid. Given each assumption, the
aforementioned measure serves as a solid indication of what governors and legislatures
may consider when deciding whether to opt into the expansion. KFF thoroughly tracks
rates of uninsured populations, according to information from the United States Census
Bureau. Thus, KFF possesses valid and reliable information pertaining to rates of
uninsured populations. Considering states vary in population size, percentages are used to
emphasize relativity. Table 1 portrays data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Tables 1 and 2 also include data indicating whether particular states were party to
Sebelius, for comparative purposes.52
Study Sample
This study sample excludes states that developed alternative plans through section
1115 waivers to expand coverage (Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and
New Hampshire).39-40, 48 Table 1. States embracing some form of expanded coverage
implicates more of an attention to policy than political resilience. However, political
resilience may also account for the push for alternative plans. Thus, excluding such states
reduces error and increase validity and reliability of results.
The study sample also excludes split-party states that did not embrace PPACA
under executive orders (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) or chose not to
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expand coverage (Maine, Missouri, and Virginia), considering the impossibility to
decipher party influence.39, 49 Table 1. In those split-party states, it is unclear whether
decisions were primarily driven by a particular party’s influence. For the purposes of this
study, party influence is essential to assess a potential relationship between political
motives and executive or legislative decision-making in states.
Analysis and Instrumentation
This study utilizes analysis of variance (ANOVA), chi-squared testing, and
hypothesis testing between statistics to reveal potential relationships between variables.
(1) Between the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables, this study: (a) employs an
ANOVA test to assess whether variance exists in uninsured rates among states that either
opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand Medicaid;
and (b) employs a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of unequal variances. (2)
Between the “Opted In” and “Party” variables, this study: (a) employs chi-squared
testing; and (b) employs a 2-sample z-test, considering proportions reflect party
affiliation between states that opted into the expansion and those that chose not to expand
Medicaid. (3) Between the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables, this study: (a) employs an
ANOVA test to assess whether variance exists in uninsured rates among states that
classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value states)
according to tables 1 and 2; and (b) employs a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of
unequal variances. Microsoft® Excel® Version 14.5.2 for Mac 2011 was utilized to
conduct necessary tests.
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Hypotheses
1. For the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables: it is hypothesized that analysis
will reveal a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under the
ANOVA test, it is hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states that
either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand
Medicaid. In other words, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow
rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among states
that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand
Medicaid (𝐻" :	
  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇) ). This study also employs a 2-sample t-test under the
assumption of unequal variances. Under the 2-sample t-test, this study expects to find a pvalue small enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no difference
between states that opted to expand coverage and those that did not, based on potential
impact on the uninsured (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, it is predicted there is a relationship
between policy and executive and legislative decision-making.
2. For the “Opted In” and “Party” variables: it is hypothesized that analysis will
reveal a statistically significant difference between the two variables. This study employs
chi-squared testing to assess how well the data align with expected results and whether
the data are independent or related. The chi-squared test assesses the proportions of
Democratic, Republican, and split-party states that either opted in or out of the expansion,
or developed an alternative plan to expand coverage. It is hypothesized that political party
affiliation and decisions regarding Medicaid expansion are related. In other words, this
study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that
states’ decisions whether to opt into the Medicaid expansion and party affiliation are
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independent (𝐻" : "Opted In" and “Party” are independent). This study also employs a 2sample z-test, considering proportions reflect party affiliation between states that opted
into the expansion and those that chose not to expand Medicaid. Under the 2-sample ztest, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the proportion of states that opted to
expand coverage and the proportion of those that did not, based on party affiliation (𝑃& −
𝑃( ≤ 0). Thus, it is predicted there is a relationship between politics and executive and
legislative decision-making.
3. For the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables: it is hypothesized that analysis will
reveal a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under the ANOVA
test, it is hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states that classify as
either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value states) according to
tables 1 and 2. In other words, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow
rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among states
that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (𝐻" :	
  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇) ). This study
also employs a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of unequal variances. Under the 2sample t-test, this study expects to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the
null hypothesis that there is no difference in uninsured rates between states that differ
with respect to party affiliation (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, it is predicted Democratic and
Republican states likely have different rates of uninsured citizens.
An array of descriptive statistics fully captures the essence of the data; including,
ranges, minimums and maximums, and sample means (𝑥) ± standard deviations (s),
among others. The following results reflect comparative and statistical data analysis.
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Results
DATA PRIOR TO EXCLUSION
Prior to exclusion, this study gathered data from the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. Of the 51 subjects, 32 (63%) opted into expanding coverage under PPACA or
through an alternative plan, and 19 (37%) chose not to expand Medicaid. The mean
percentage of uninsured citizens among all 51 subjects was 12.22 ± 3.65 and ranged from
4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 20% (Nevada (R) and Texas (R)). Additionally, 16 subjects
(31%) affiliated with the Democratic Party compared to 24 (47%) that affiliated with the
Republican Party. Table 1.
Of the 51 subjects in the study, 26 (51%) were party to Sebelius. Among the 26
that were party to Sebelius, 14 (54%) chose not to expand Medicaid. The mean
percentage of uninsured citizens for subjects that were party to Sebelius was 13.38 ±
3.54, and ranged from 9% (Iowa (split), South Dakota (R), and Wisconsin (R)) to 20%
(Nevada (R) and Texas (R)). Moreover, 20 of the 26 subjects (77%) affiliated with the
Republican Party. Table 1.
Hypotheses
1. For the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that
analysis would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under
the ANOVA test, it was hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states
that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand
Medicaid. In other words, this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow
rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among states
that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to expand
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Medicaid (𝐻" :	
  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇) ). The 26 subjects that opted into the expansion have a mean
percentage of uninsured citizens of 11.35 ± 3.90, ranging from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to
20% (Nevada (R)). The mean percentage of uninsured citizens for the 6 subjects that
developed an alternative plan to expand coverage was 12.17 ± 2.40 and ranged from 9%
(Iowa (split)) to 15% (Arkansas (split) and Montana (split)). The 19 subjects that chose
not to expand Medicaid have a mean percentage of uninsured citizens of 13.42 ± 3.36,
ranging from 9% (South Dakota (R) and Wisconsin (R)) to 20% (Texas (R)). Consistent
with the initial hypothesis, a cursory review of the data suggest variance exists in
uninsured rates among states that either opted into the expansion, developed an
alternative plan, or chose not to expand Medicaid. However, an ANOVA test yielded a pvalue of 0.16730 which is too high to allow rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, this
study fails to reject the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates among
states that either opted into the expansion, developed an alternative plan, or chose not to
expand Medicaid (𝐻" :	
  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇) ).
2. For the “Opted In” and “Party” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. For all subjects
prior to exclusion, this study employed chi-squared testing to assess how well the data
align with expected results and whether the data are independent or related. The chisquared test assessed the proportions of Democratic, Republican, and split-party states
that either opted in or out of the expansion, or developed an alternative plan to expand
coverage. Results are shown below:
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Democratic

Republican

Split

Total

Opted-In

15

4

7

26

Opted-Out

0

16

3

19

Alternative

0

2

4

6

Total

15

22

14

51

Chi-Squared Statistic: 30.9348
P-Value: < 0.00001

It was hypothesized that the chi-squared test would find that the variables are
related. In other words, this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow
rejection of the null hypothesis that states’ decisions whether to opt into the Medicaid
expansion and party affiliation are independent
(𝐻" : "Opted In" and “Party” are independent). The chi-squared test yielded a p-value of <
0.00001. This p-value is low enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that states’
decisions whether to opt into the Medicaid expansion and party affiliation are
independent (𝐻+ : "Opted In" and “Party” are not	
  independent). Therefore, states’
decisions and party affiliation, i.e. politics, are likely related.
3. For the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under the
ANOVA test, it was hypothesized that variance exists in uninsured rates among states
that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value states)
according to tables 1 and 2. In other words, this study expected to find a p-value small
enough to allow rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured rates

32

among states that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (𝐻" :	
  𝜇& = 𝜇( = 𝜇) ).
The 16 subjects that classified as Democratic have a mean percentage of uninsured
citizens of 9.75 ± 3.17, ranging from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 15% (California (D)).
The mean percentage of uninsured citizens for the 24 subjects that classified as
Republican was 14.08 ± 3.37 and ranged from 9% (South Dakota (R) and Wisconsin (R))
to 20% (Nevada (R) and Texas (R)). The 11 subjects that classified as other (independent
or no-value states) have a mean percentage of uninsured citizens of 11.73 ± 2.49, ranging
from 9% (Iowa and Rhode Island) to 16% (Alaska). Consistent with the initial
hypothesis, a cursory review of the data suggest variance exists in uninsured rates among
states that classified as either Democratic, Republican, or other (independent or no-value
states) according to tables 1 and 2. An ANOVA test yielded a p-value of 0.00040. This
low p-value allows rejection of the null hypothesis that no variance exists in uninsured
rates among states that classify as either Democratic, Republican, or other (𝐻+ :	
  𝜇& ≠
𝜇( ≠ 𝜇) ).

DATA FOLLOWING EXCLUSION
Following exclusion of states for reasons described in the methodology, the study
sample consisted of 37 states and the District of Columbia (N = 38). Of the 38 subjects,
22 (58%) have opted into expanding coverage under PPACA, and 16 (42%) have chosen
not to expand Medicaid. The mean percentage of uninsured citizens in the total sample
was 12.39 ± 4.00 and ranged from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 20% (Nevada (R) and
Texas (R)). Additionally, 16 subjects (42%) affiliated with the Democratic Party
compared to 22 (58%) that affiliated with the Republican Party. Table 2.
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Of the 38 subjects in the sample, 20 (53%) were party to Sebelius. Among the 20
that were party to Sebelius, 13 (65%) chose not to expand Medicaid. The mean
percentage of uninsured citizens for subjects that were party to Sebelius was 14.00 ±
3.63, and ranged from 9% (South Dakota (R) and Wisconsin (R)) to 20% (Nevada (R)
and Texas (R)). Moreover, 18 of the 20 subjects (90%) affiliated with the Republican
Party. Table 2.
Hypotheses
1. For the “Opted In” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that
analysis would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. In
other words, this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the
null hypothesis that there is no difference between states that opted to expand coverage
and those that did not, based on potential impact on the uninsured (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus,
it was predicted there is a relationship between policy and executive and legislative
decision-making. The 22 subjects that opted into the expansion have a mean percentage
of uninsured citizens of 11.27 ± 4.08, ranging from 4% (Massachusetts (D)) to 20%
(Nevada (R)). The mean percentage of uninsured citizens for the 16 subjects that chose
not to expand Medicaid was 13.94 ± 3.42 and ranged from 9% (South Dakota (R) and
Wisconsin (R)) to 20% (Texas (R)). Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the data
suggest a difference between states that opted to expand coverage and those that did not,
based on potential impact on the uninsured. However, data also suggest that states with
higher rates of uninsured citizens did not expand coverage. This possible conclusion is
inconsistent with the policy rationale of expanding coverage—to assist uninsured citizens
in obtaining health insurance. Nonetheless, a 2-sample t-test under the assumption of
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unequal variances yielded a p-value of 0.03562. This low p-value allows rejection of the
null hypothesis that there is no difference between states that opted to expand coverage
and those that did not, based on potential impact on the uninsured (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus,
there is a relationship between policy and executive and legislative decision-making on
the issue at hand, even though the direction of influence is inconsistent with the policy
rationale of expanding coverage eligibility to address the massive uninsured population
(𝐻" − 𝐻+ ≠ 0).
2. For the “Opted In” and “Party” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. Under	
  a	
  2-‐‑
sample,	
  1-‐‑tailed	
  z-‐‑test,	
  this	
  study	
  expected	
  to	
  find	
  a	
  p-‐‑value	
  small	
  enough	
  to	
  allow	
  
rejection	
  of	
  the	
  null	
  hypothesis	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  difference	
  between	
  the	
  proportion	
  of	
  
states	
  that	
  opted	
  to	
  expand	
  coverage	
  and	
  the	
  proportion	
  of	
  those	
  that	
  did	
  not,	
  based	
  
on	
  party	
  affiliation	
  (𝑃& − 𝑃( ≤ 0).	
  Thus,	
  it	
  was	
  predicted	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  relationship	
  
between	
  politics	
  and	
  executive	
  and	
  legislative	
  decision-‐‑making.	
  Of	
  the	
  22	
  subjects	
  
that	
  chose	
  to	
  embrace	
  PPACA,	
  16	
  affiliated	
  with	
  the	
  Democratic	
  Party	
  (73%)	
  and	
  6	
  
affiliated	
  with	
  the	
  Republican	
  Party	
  (27%).	
  All	
  16	
  subjects	
  that	
  chose	
  not	
  to	
  embrace	
  
PPACA	
  affiliated	
  with	
  the	
  Republican	
  Party	
  (100%).	
  Thus,	
  a	
  proportion	
  of	
  0.73	
  ±	
  
0.46	
  subjects	
  opted	
  into	
  the	
  expansion	
  and	
  affiliated	
  with	
  the	
  Democratic	
  Party,	
  
compared	
  to	
  a	
  proportion	
  of	
  0.00	
  ±	
  0.00	
  subjects	
  that	
  chose	
  not	
  to	
  expand	
  Medicaid	
  
and	
  affiliated	
  with	
  the	
  Democratic	
  Party.	
  It	
  appears	
  a	
  difference	
  exists	
  between	
  
subjects	
  that	
  opted	
  to	
  expand	
  coverage	
  and	
  those	
  that	
  did	
  not,	
  based	
  on	
  party	
  
affiliation.	
  A	
  2-‐‑sample,	
  1-‐‑tailed	
  z-‐‑test	
  yielded	
  a	
  p-‐‑value	
  of	
  0.00968.	
  This	
  low	
  p-‐‑value	
  
allows	
  rejection	
  of	
  the	
  null	
  hypothesis	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  difference	
  between	
  the	
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proportion	
  of	
  states	
  that	
  opted	
  to	
  expand	
  coverage	
  and	
  the	
  proportion	
  of	
  those	
  that	
  
did	
  not,	
  based	
  on	
  party	
  affiliation	
  (𝑃& − 𝑃( ≤ 0).	
  Thus,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  relationship	
  
between	
  politics	
  and	
  executive	
  and	
  legislative	
  decision-‐‑making	
  (𝑃& − 𝑃( > 0).	
  	
  
3. For the “Party” and “Uninsured” variables: it was hypothesized that analysis
would find a statistically significant difference between the two variables. In other words,
this study expected to find a p-value small enough to allow rejection of the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in uninsured rates between states that differ with
respect to party affiliation (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, it was predicted Democratic and
Republican states likely have different rates of uninsured citizens. The 16 subjects in the
sample that affiliated with the Democratic Party have a mean percentage of uninsured
citizens of 9.75 ± 3.17 that ranged from 4% (Massachusetts) to 15% (California). The 22
subjects that affiliated with the Republican Party have a mean percentage of 14.32 ± 3.43,
ranging from 9% (South Dakota and Wisconsin) to 20% (Nevada and Texas). Consistent
with the initial hypothesis, the data suggest a difference in uninsured rates between states
that differ with respect to party affiliation. A 2-sample t-test under the assumption of
unequal variances yielded a p-value of 0.00017. This low p-value allows rejection of the
null hypothesis that there is no difference in uninsured rates between states that differ
with respect to party affiliation (𝐻" − 𝐻+ = 0). Thus, Democratic and Republican states
have statistically different rates of uninsured citizens (𝐻" − 𝐻+ ≠ 0). Specifically,
Republican states have higher rates of uninsured citizens than Democratic states.
In summary, comparative and statistical data analysis suggests there is a
relationship between both policy and politics, and executive and legislative decisionmaking. The direction of influence of policy implications regarding the uninsured is
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inconsistent with PPACA’s policy rationale of expanding coverage eligibility under
Medicaid to address the massive uninsured population. However, Republican states have
higher rates of uninsured citizens than Democratic states. Therefore, inconsistencies may
be incidental to overall political influence and social structure within states.
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Discussion
At a broad level, considering this study’s limitations, one implication of this
study’s findings is that states do not adequately consider public health policy when
making executive or legislative decisions.
Prior to the major insurance provisions of PPACA, the United States healthcare
system was characterized by poor performance and quality. Additionally, America spent
more on health care than any other country in the world. In other words, America
invested a lot of resources only to not get results. A vast population of Americans did not
have health care coverage. As a result, many Americans did not have access to health
care—a promotor of health outcomes. To address these issues, the Obama Administration
developed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
PPACA focuses on primary care and preventive efforts, effectively incentivizes
obtaining health insurance, and extends coverage eligibility to millions of Americans.
Extending coverage may allow millions of Americans to access health care. Access to
care may, in turn, promote health.
PPACA is a product of public health policy—characterized by a focus on
preventive and upstream action to address the health of the population. The public health
policy of PPACA serves as a foundation to improve the health status of the population
and achieve the goals of PPACA. However, if public health policy achieves its goals, the
nation will not notice it according to the paradox of prevention. Nonetheless, efforts
ensue considering public health advocates believe that health is a human right. PPACA
allows millions of Americans to have coverage and, in turn, access to health care. Under
PPACA, millions of Americans may see better health outcomes. In summary, PPACA
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comports with public health policy and aims to improve the health status of the
population.
Despite compelling public health policy reasons to embrace PPACA, many states
and private sector organizations opposed PPACA and sought to strike down its key
provisions. With respect to the Medicaid expansion provision, opponents partially
succeeded in a favorable Supreme Court decision in Sebelius which gave states the
choice whether to opt into the Medicaid expansion outlined in PPACA, develop an
alternative plan—subject to federal approval—to expand health insurance coverage under
Medicaid, or do neither. Politics likely guided states in making their decisions.
In the world of politics, party affiliation and economics likely play the greatest
roles. Most opposition to legislation comes from parties that did not develop it. This
suggests that parties will resist enactments by their opponent parties. Despite policy
rationales, political motives may guide executive and legislative decision-making.
America’s bipartisan system of government creates a divide and introduces
barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation. For example, in 2013, Texas had the
highest rate of uninsured citizens in the nation and, therefore, had an opportunity to make
a significant impact on reducing the uninsured population. Table 1. However, Texas
fought PPACA more adamantly than most other states. Texas closely affiliates with the
Republican Party. Thus, while Texas could have made a tremendous impact in advancing
PPACA’s policy goal of expanding coverage eligibility to address the massive uninsured
population, it chose not to. It is possible that economics, fiscal concerns, and per capita
spending, among other factors, played a role in its decision. Politics is another
explanation.
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Texas is not alone. According to the results of this study, the states that chose not
to expand Medicaid affiliated only with the Republican Party. Moreover, all states that
affiliated with the Democratic Party embraced PPACA. Table 2. A cursory review of the
data clearly depicts this divide. Moreover, a divide exists between states that opted to
expand coverage and those that did not, based on potential impact on the uninsured.
Statistical analysis suggests there is a relationship between policy and executive and
legislative decision-making. However, the results also reveal that the states—like
Texas—that had the highest rates of uninsured citizens were the states that chose not to
expand Medicaid. This finding is inconsistent with the policy rationale of expanding
Medicaid to assist uninsured populations. If a state has a large uninsured population,
embracing the expansion could significantly advance the policy goals of PPACA.
However, the states that had the greatest opportunity to advance PPACA’s policy goals
were the states that chose not to expand Medicaid.
Statistical analysis of states’ decisions regarding Medicaid expansion and political
party affiliation also found significant results. Results suggests decisions and party
affiliation are likely related. Thus, there is a relationship between politics and executive
and legislative decision-making.
Republican states, generally, chose not to expand Medicaid whereas Democratic
states predominately embraced the expansion. In America’s bipartisan system of
government with conflicting interests, it makes sense politically for Democratic states to
embrace PPACA and Republican states to oppose it since a Democratic administration
enacted PPACA. Nonetheless, states that need expanded coverage the most, the states

40

with the highest rates of uninsured citizens—Republican states, as the results found—did
not embrace PPACA.
This study’s findings pertaining to policy and decisions regarding Medicaid
expansion are inconsistent with PPACA’s policy rationale of expanding	
  coverage	
  
eligibility	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  massive	
  uninsured	
  population. At a broad level, considering
this study’s limitations, it is inferable that states did not adequately consider the public
health policy underlying PPACA when deciding whether to expand Medicaid. Other
factors possibly influenced the states’ decisions. Nonetheless, the literature review and
results suggest that political party affiliation is a viable and likely explanation.
Economics may help explain decisions regarding Medicaid expansion under
PPACA. A state may consider how Medicaid expansion will affect its budget in coming
years. States may assess whether they have the fiscal capacity to absorb Medicaid costs
when federal funding diminishes and places more of a financial responsibility on states.
States may choose to invest more per capita on programs other than Medicaid and,
therefore, choose not to expand Medicaid due to spending concerns. Future studies can
look more thoroughly at the numbers behind the decisions, including: budget shortages,
cost sharing ratios, fiscal capacities, and per capita spending, among others. This study
merely discusses economics conceptually. However, the significant results with respect to
political party affiliation suggest that politics guide the executive and legislative decisionmaking process.
In politics, “the future is tomorrow.” This mantra contrasts with the long-term
nature of public health goals. Thus, a tension exists between politicians and public health
advocates when deciding whether to embrace legislation that has both short- and long-
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term effects. Politicians and voters alike must understand both the short- and long-term
effects of legislation. Maybe then, more people will understand the need to promote
health and how public health coverage can achieve that goal. This analysis is intended as
a bridge between public health and law regarding policy and politics. Principles identified
and discussed in this paper may prove useful when analyzing future legislation.
Ultimately, this analysis identifies a need for more effective public health advocacy in
order to overcome political barriers to achieving the policy goals of legislation.
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Table 1: Data for the 50 States and the District of Columbia
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska*
Nevada
NewPHampshire
NewPJersey
NewPMexico
NewPYork
NorthPCarolina
NorthPDakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
RhodePIsland
SouthPCarolina
SouthPDakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
WestPVirginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
DistrictPofPColumbia

Opted(In((0(=(no,(1(=(yes)
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1

Party((0(=(R,(1(=(D)
0
N/A*
0

Party(Control:
Republican
Split
Democratic
*Unicameral

Key((as(of(2016):
OptedPInP=P1
AlternativePPlanP=P1
OptedPOutP=P0

*Independent

1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0

0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1

Uninsured((%)
16
16
19
15
15
13
9
7
19
16
5
14
11
12
9
10
13
12
10
10
4
11
7
14
11
15
10
20
11
12
16
9
16
12
13
14
13
10
9
15
9
13
20
11
8
11
11
13
9
17
8

Executive/Legislative*
N/A
Exec
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec
Exec
Exec
N/A
N/A
Exec
N/A
Exec
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
N/A
Exec
Exec
N/A
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
N/A
N/A
Exec/Legis
N/A
Exec
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec
Exec
N/A
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
N/A
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A*
N/A
Exec/Legis
Exec
N/A
N/A
Exec

For(2013
12.21568627
3.629400642

*HCAPCommissioner

Year(of(Decision
N/A
2015
2013
2014
2013
2013
2010
2013
N/A
N/A
2012
N/A
2013
2014
2013
N/A
2013
2016
N/A
2013
2013
2013
2013
N/A
N/A
2015
N/A
2012
2014
2013
2013
2012
N/A
2013
2013
N/A
2013
2015
2013
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2012
N/A
2013
2013
N/A
N/A
2010

Brought(Suit(in(Sebelius((0(=(no,(1(=(yes)
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
N/A
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Table 2: Data for the Study Sample (N = 38)
State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Illinois
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Nevada
NewJMexico
NewJYork
NorthJDakota
Ohio
Oregon
Vermont
Washington
WestJVirginia
DistrictJofJColumbia
Alabama
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Kansas
Mississippi
Nebraska*
NorthJCarolina
Oklahoma
SouthJCarolina
SouthJDakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Opted(In((0(=(no,(1(=(yes)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Party(Control:
Republican
Split
Democratic
*Unicameral

Key((as(of(2016):
OptedJInJ=J1
AlternativeJPlanJ=J1
OptedJOutJ=J0

Party((0(=(R,(1(=(D)
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Uninsured((%)
19
15
13
9
7
5
11
13
12
10
4
7
20
16
9
12
13
13
8
11
13
8
16
19
16
14
10
14
10
16
14
15
9
13
20
11
9
17

Executive/Legislative*
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec
Exec
Exec
Exec
Exec
Exec
Exec
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec
Exec
Exec
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
Exec/Legis
N/A*
Exec/Legis
Exec
Exec
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

For(2013
12.39473684
3.996887124

*HCAJCommissioner

Year(of(Decision
2013
2013
2013
2010
2013
2012
2013
2013
2016
2013
2013
2013
2012
2013
2012
2013
2013
2013
2012
2013
2013
2010
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Brought(Suit(in(Sebelius((0(=(no,(1(=(yes)
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
N/A
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
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